Douglas Kelly, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
I’m tired and there’s way too much text on these slides for me to take coherent notes. Also, there’s serious math going on in this presentation which is way over my head. Sorry.
Colonel Steven Mains, US Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
- Thesis
- us govt is ceding to the info war to our enemies
- more money is required
- govt must be reorganized to retake the initiative
- 2 examples of what could have been
- prior to OIF, France & Muslin world opposed invasion but were open to influence
- IEDs became weapon of choice but have severe vulnerabilities
- the problem
- coordinated campaign required
- info ops not integrated into planning and decision making
- govt to people comms almost nonexistent
- US Govt built in stovepipes
- complete reorganization of the govt not a feasible option
- End
- advance US ideals and policies by ensuing that everyone has access to factual, unbiased, unfiltered info about intentions, actions & character of US, allies & adversaries
- Ways
- gauge world views by region, ethnicity, religion
- identify market segments
- identify acceptance and effects of policies
- deliver truthful, tailored content that relies on our values to our policies
- continuous reassessment
- Means
- Dep advisor to prez for national security (strategic communications)
- increased national security council
- strategic comms task force
- dept of state reorg
- DNI: covert communications
- DHS: Infrastructure assurance
- USAID: substantially increased Public Diplomacy capability
- DOD: integrated into PD efforts, CNO
Jeff Boleng, US Sir Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO
- Cyberspace added to USAF mission in 2005
- cyberspace is a warfighting domain
- cyberspace covers all the other domains (air, land, sea, space)
- different domains, different fucntions
- recent threats & motivations
- Hezbollah SIGINT attack on Israeli tanks
- DNS Root Server attack 2007
- Estonia 2007
- pakistan youtube redirect 2008
- IED jammers
- F-22 flight over international dateline (avionics went black)
- Broad requirements
- USAFA graduates 1/4 of all new 2nd lieutenants
- not “geek” focused
- technical w/ a large dose of
- ethics
- legal studies
- behavioral studies
- military strategic studies
- contrasting questions
- how can we exploit adversary’s e-systems
- what is the legal authority
- what are the national security implications
- is cyber attack an act of war
- prep of graduates
- currently underway
- core curriculum
- baseline content
- new upper-level courses
- ensure coverage of AF education and training requirements
- training to reinforce education
- “unlike a traditional college we own our students”
- basic cadet training scenarios
- global engagement integration
- summer space program
- summer UAV program
- DHS sponsored Black Dart
- CS – Cyber Warfare Track
- 37 grads since 2004, 8 in 2008
- offered to all CS majors
- NSA & DHS recognized standards
- 3 courses taken as major options
- cryptography
- Cs security & IW
- network security
- details on the three courses given
- Research
- Academy Center for Cyberspace Research
- current projects
- jam resistant communications
- biometrics
- security education
- Community involvement
- other front range colleges
- cyber defense exercise
- computer and network vulnerability assessment
Dr. Thomas J. Holt, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
- digital crime markets
- problem is increasing
- also becoming more complex
- criminological research
- little research has been done
- few studies have explored malware and hacker community in their own words
- online resources
- blogs
- forums
- this study focuses on Russia & China
- not using their real handles
- data & methods
- identify 2 via snowball samples
- qualitative analyses of open source materials online
- RUSH
- malware writer and hacker in Moscow
- skilled individual
- possible emotional problems
- RUN
- close associate of RUSH
- skilled hacker
- CS major at a Moscow university
- may have minor health issues
- loves his cat
- Black Hat Gang
- both RUSH and RUN belong
- no stated political or financial agenda
- provide a justification for their activities
- rush & ru seem to have dif levels of productivity
- SAINT
- Chinese national in Jinzhou
- does not specify his motives but gives Chinese perspective
- actions are somewhat contrary to his words
- young student but doesn’t enjoy school
- likes girls & posts comments about love & relationships
- SNAKE
- associate of SAINT
- difficult to gage his skill level
- may be a script kiddie
- is a student
- may also have emotional issues though no specific reasons given
- Hack Crew
- SNAKE & SAINT are members
- covert security technology group
- criteria for membership
- roles listed for members
- SNAKE is a cracker
- SAINT is a hacker/cracker
- not clear how skilled group is as a whole
- Discussion
- all extremely interested in tech
- variation in skill levels
- justify what they do as education
- some evidence of depression & substance abuse
- variation in information provided
- public & private resources needed to get mroe info
- further research needed
Jamison Scheeres, Air Force Institute of Technology
- what is social engineering
- techniques to manipulate people
- also shoulder surfing
- also dumpster diving
- trick someone into doing something
- huge threat in today’s environment
- red teams say SE is 100% effective
- current defensive techniques are not effective
- research
- successful SEs are not caught
- classification issues
- ethical issues in deceiving subjects
- psychological triggers
- authority
- reciprocation
- strong affect (phishing)
- overloading (buffer overflow for humans)
- deceptive relationships
- integrity/consistency
- principles of persuasion
- authority
- consistency
- liking
- reciprocity
- scarcity
- social proof
- resistance to persuasion
- inoculation theory
- self-efficacy
- forewarning
- “dispelling the illusion of invulnerability” (2002, Sagarin)
- methodology
- compared psych triggers to principles of persuasion
- determine relationship between illegitimate persuasion & social engineering
- military vulnerable to authority due to strict hierarchy of authority
- conclusions
- strong relationship between principles and triggers
- illegitimate persuasion = social engineering
- been trying to install resistance in the wrong way
- solution is to demo to the individual they are personally vulnerable
- security people must social engineer their people
- future research
- develope measurement
- compare/validate various means of resistance training
Brigadier General Davis, US Strategic Command (Network Warfare)
- Rapidly evolving battlespace
- as long as we have two eyes and opposable thumbs we’ll fight
- econ major in college, never taken a CS course
- I’m a social science guy
- was never good at math until he had to learn how to make a bomb hit its target
- Heads groups that operationalizes network warfare
- has been learning about the cyberspace fight
- tech has always made new inroads into warfare
- modern networking tech is no exception
- air, land, sea, space, now cyberspace
- evolutionary steps in warfare
- not going to talk about servers and high tech
- what can we learn from the past
- navigate the rocks and shoals of change
- looks back to the advent of air power in warfare
- some thought that war could be won by airpower alone
- Curtis LaMay, father of Strategic Air Command
- continuous readiness – 24/7
- should also apply to cyberspace
- Roy Geiger, saw airpower as part of a team effort, WWI Marine
- but airpower could still be decisive
- Geiger was there for for Bikini Atoll tests
- the change was about speed and reaction time in this nuclear age
- Geiger continued to say that it depended on an integrated effort
- in cyberspace timelines are reduced to miliseconds
- starting to learn what it takes to accomplish this
- some was it’s different, some things are the same
- must change and adapt
- “spectrum of conflict”
- peace-something happens-spool up-war-spool down-back to peace
- exploitation of anonymity
- across a broad spectrum of activities
- no one major adversary in cyberspace, could be anyone
- not just the velociraptor nation -state we’re up against
- must be able to scale up operations quickly
- final analysis: “there is no peace in cyberspace”
- must be ready 24/7
- multi-diciplined force of cyberwarriors is needed
- must be ready when a crisis presents itself, which could be anytime
- Marine General – three-block war: humanitarian/infrastructure, peacekeeping, high intensity conflict
- we have the advantage in cyberspace right now but superiority would be better
- no one military service can own this fight
- military must partner with the intel community, law enforcement, allies
- will need new authorities and policies
- we are a nation of laws and those must be followed
- “I’ve got a bunch of lawyers too”
- training & education is key
- must sustain operations to the highest level at all times including peacetime
- on guard at all times
- offensive and defensive tools
- must integrate cyberspace tools with those in other war-fighting domains
- must take account of trans-regional nature of cyberspace
- no geographic boundaries
- no single points of vulnerability
- a digital bullet doesn’t follow a straight line
- multi-point attacks
- our capabilities need to be distributed
My photos from day one of the conference are up in a flickr set. This evening I’l be adding my day two photos. Even if you’re not interested in the conference itself, be sure to check out the photos of Firefly, the supercomputer cluster on the UNO campus. Not only were we allowed into the room, we were actually allowed to walk within the clusters themselves. Let’s just say it was quite the experience.
