ICIW2008: Closing thoughts

Well, the conference is over. Here's the thoughts I've been left with.

When military folks talk about "open source" they're not talking about "OpenSource" as we know it i.e. OpenSource software. What they mean is non-military sources i.e. the mainstream media. Once I came to this realization several things I'd head in the past two days had completely different meanings.

This was my first "academic conference" and it's not what I'm used to. What I'm used to us presentations about software, and events, and "here's what we did". At this conference it was 20 minute presentations of the research presented as papers in the conference proceedings. I understand that this is the standard for academic conferences but I'm just not used to it. That doesn't mean didn't enjoy the conference but it was a tad frustrating hearing "and you can read more about it in my paper" in most of the sessions.

Overall I enjoyed my time over the past two days. I thought I was going to be in over my head but surprisingly I wasn't. (Except for that last session.) It's always interesting to step out of your comfort zone and learn some new thing and new perspective.

ICIW2008: Analyzing Anonymity in Cyberspace

Douglas Kelly, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

I'm tired and there's way too much text on these slides for me to take coherent notes. Also, there's serious math going on in this presentation which is way over my head. Sorry.

ICIW2008: Organizing the US Government for the Contemporary Environment

Colonel Steven Mains, US Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned

• Thesis
• us govt is ceding to the info war to our enemies
• more money is required
• govt must be reorganized to retake the initiative
• 2 examples of what could have been
• prior to OIF, France & Muslin world opposed invasion but were open to influence
• IEDs became weapon of choice but have severe vulnerabilities
• the problem
• coordinated campaign required
• info ops not integrated into planning and decision making
• govt to people comms almost nonexistent
• US Govt built in stovepipes
• complete reorganization of the govt not a feasible option
• End
• advance US ideals and policies by ensuing that everyone has access to factual, unbiased, unfiltered info about intentions, actions & character of US, allies & adversaries
• Ways
• gauge world views by region, ethnicity, religion
• identify market segments
• identify acceptance and effects of policies
• deliver truthful, tailored content that relies on our values to our policies
• continuous reassessment
• Means
• Dep advisor to prez for national security (strategic communications)
• increased national security council
• strategic comms task force
• dept of state reorg
• DNI: covert communications
• DHS: Infrastructure assurance
• USAID: substantially increased Public Diplomacy capability
• DOD: integrated into PD efforts, CNO

ICIW2008: Developing Cyber Warriors

Jeff Boleng, US Sir Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO

• Cyberspace added to USAF mission in 2005
• cyberspace is a warfighting domain
• cyberspace covers all the other domains (air, land, sea, space)
• different domains, different fucntions
• recent threats & motivations
• Hezbollah SIGINT attack on Israeli tanks
• DNS Root Server attack 2007
• Estonia 2007
• pakistan youtube redirect 2008
• IED jammers
• F-22 flight over international dateline (avionics went black)
• Broad requirements
• USAFA graduates 1/4 of all new 2nd lieutenants
• not "geek" focused
• technical w/ a large dose of
• ethics
• legal studies
• behavioral studies
• military strategic studies
• contrasting questions
• how can we exploit adversary's e-systems
• what is the legal authority
• what are the national security implications
• is cyber attack an act of war
• prep of graduates
• well documented outcomes
• currently underway
• core curriculum
• baseline content
• new upper-level courses
• ensure coverage of AF education and training requirements
• training to reinforce education
• "unlike a traditional college we own our students"
• basic cadet training scenarios
• global engagement integration
• summer space program
• summer UAV program
• DHS sponsored Black Dart
• CS - Cyber Warfare Track
• 37 grads since 2004, 8 in 2008
• offered to all CS majors
• NSA & DHS recognized standards
• 3 courses taken as major options
• cryptography
• Cs security & IW
• network security
• details on the three courses given
• Research
• Academy Center for Cyberspace Research
• current projects
• jam resistant communications
• biometrics
• security education
• Community involvement
• other front range colleges
• cyber defense exercise
• computer and network vulnerability assessment

ICIW2008: Characterizing Malware Writers can Computer Attackers in Their Own Words

Dr. Thomas J. Holt, University of North Carolina, Charlotte

• digital crime markets
• problem is increasing
• also becoming more complex
• criminological research
• little research has been done
• few studies have explored malware and hacker community in their own words
• online resources
• blogs
• forums
• this study focuses on Russia & China
• not using their real handles
• data & methods
• qualitative analysis
• identify 2 via snowball samples
• qualitative analyses of open source materials online
• linguists involved
• RUSH
• malware writer and hacker in Moscow
• skilled individual
• possible emotional problems
• RUN
• close associate of RUSH
• skilled hacker
• CS major at a Moscow university
• may have minor health issues
• loves his cat
• Black Hat Gang
• both RUSH and RUN belong
• no stated political or financial agenda
• provide a justification for their activities
• rush & ru seem to have dif levels of productivity
• have worked together
• SAINT
• Chinese national in Jinzhou
• does not specify his motives but gives Chinese perspective
• actions are somewhat contrary to his words
• young student but doesn't enjoy school
• likes girls & posts comments about love & relationships
• SNAKE
• associate of SAINT
• difficult to gage his skill level
• may be a script kiddie
• is a student
• may also have emotional issues though no specific reasons given
• Hack Crew
• SNAKE & SAINT are members
• covert security technology group
• criteria for membership
• roles listed for members
• SNAKE is a cracker
• SAINT is a hacker/cracker
• not clear how skilled group is as a whole
• Discussion
• all extremely interested in tech
• variation in skill levels
• justify what they do as education
• some evidence of depression & substance abuse
• variation in information provided
• public & private resources needed to get mroe info
• further research needed

ICIW2008: Establishing the Human Firewall: Improving Resistance to Social Engineering Attacks

Jamison Scheeres, Air Force Institute of Technology

• what is social engineering
• techniques to manipulate people
• also shoulder surfing
• also dumpster diving
• trick someone into doing something
• huge threat in today's environment
• red teams say SE is 100% effective
• current defensive techniques are not effective
• research
• successful SEs are not caught
• classification issues
• ethical issues in deceiving subjects
• psychological triggers
• authority
• reciprocation
• strong affect (phishing)
• overloading (buffer overflow for humans)
• deceptive relationships
• integrity/consistency
• principles of persuasion
• authority
• consistency
• liking
• reciprocity
• scarcity
• social proof
• resistance to persuasion
• inoculation theory
• self-efficacy
• forewarning
• "dispelling the illusion of invulnerability" (2002, Sagarin)
• methodology
• compared psych triggers to principles of persuasion
• determine relationship between illegitimate persuasion & social engineering
• military vulnerable to authority due to strict hierarchy of authority
• conclusions
• strong relationship between principles and triggers
• illegitimate persuasion = social engineering
• been trying to install resistance in the wrong way
• solution is to demo to the individual they are personally vulnerable
• security people must social engineer their people
• future research
• develope measurement
• compare/validate various means of resistance training

ICIW2008: Day 2 Keynote

Brigadier General Davis, US Strategic Command (Network Warfare)

• Rapidly evolving battlespace
• as long as we have two eyes and opposable thumbs we'll fight
• econ major in college, never taken a CS course
• I'm a social science guy
• was never good at math until he had to learn how to make a bomb hit its target
• Heads groups that operationalizes network warfare
• has been learning about the cyberspace fight
• tech has always made new inroads into warfare
• modern networking tech is no exception
• air, land, sea, space, now cyberspace
• evolutionary steps in warfare
• not going to talk about servers and high tech
• what can we learn from the past
• navigate the rocks and shoals of change
• looks back to the advent of air power in warfare
• some thought that war could be won by airpower alone
• Curtis LaMay, father of Strategic Air Command
• continuous readiness - 24/7
• should also apply to cyberspace
• Roy Geiger, saw airpower as part of a team effort, WWI Marine
• but airpower could still be decisive
• Geiger was there for for Bikini Atoll tests
• the change was about speed and reaction time in this nuclear age
• Geiger continued to say that it depended on an integrated effort
• in cyberspace timelines are reduced to miliseconds
• starting to learn what it takes to accomplish this
• some was it's different, some things are the same
• must change and adapt
• "spectrum of conflict"
• peace-something happens-spool up-war-spool down-back to peace
• exploitation of anonymity
• across a broad spectrum of activities
• no one major adversary in cyberspace, could be anyone
• not just the velociraptor nation -state we're up against
• must be able to scale up operations quickly
• final analysis: "there is no peace in cyberspace"
• must be ready 24/7
• multi-diciplined force of cyberwarriors is needed
• must be ready when a crisis presents itself, which could be anytime
• Marine General - three-block war: humanitarian/infrastructure, peacekeeping, high intensity conflict
• we have the advantage in cyberspace right now but superiority would be better
• no one military service can own this fight
• military must partner with the intel community, law enforcement, allies
• will need new authorities and policies
• we are a nation of laws and those must be followed
• "I've got a bunch of lawyers too"
• training & education is key
• must sustain operations to the highest level at all times including peacetime
• on guard at all times
• offensive and defensive tools
• must integrate cyberspace tools with those in other war-fighting domains
• must take account of trans-regional nature of cyberspace
• no geographic boundaries
• no single points of vulnerability
• a digital bullet doesn't follow a straight line
• multi-point attacks
• our capabilities need to be distributed

ICIW2008: Day One Photos

My photos from day one of the conference are up in a flickr set. This evening I'l be adding my day two photos. Even if you're not interested in the conference itself, be sure to check out the photos of Firefly, the supercomputer cluster on the UNO campus. Not only were we allowed into the room, we were actually allowed to walk within the clusters themselves. Let's just say it was quite the experience.

ICIW2008: Religion, Ideology and Information Warfare

Geoffrey Darnton, Bournemouth University, UK

• "if you can get into people's heads you can achieve anything"
• different consequences if people fear being killed vs. wanting to be killed
• scope and key issues
• currently, mainly conceptual
• conflics vs. war
• war and conflict can only occur if people are willing to play
• "willing" - coercion or real willingness
• belief systems are critical in info warfare
• war v conflict
• technically war is a legal state
• iw = information warfare
• maybe should be saying information conflict
• Civilian-ization of warfare via info technologies
• origins of war
• technology
• law
• social organization
• opinions and attitudes concerning basic values
• willingness
• religion and ideology
• same thing or not?
• both are complex sets of characteristics
• why does it matter in the discussion of IW?
• many acts of conflict and war are done n the name of furthering or preserving some important value of belief
• meta ideo-religious framework?
• experiential
• ritual
• mythology
• ethics
• doctrine
• social
• framework extensions
• symbols
• key personalities
• faith
• deification or reification
• example religions
• middle eastern
• indian
• far eastern
• example ideologies
• capitalism
• marxism
• humanism
• social anarchism
• democracy
• are there characteristics similar to religions?
• proselytizing
• done both by religions and ideologies
• often accompanied by behaviour to discourage "non belivers"
• studies of war
• stats based on religious wars
• extensions to ideology
• how many wars have been fought based on ideology?
• empirical questions
• how many have been killed as consequence of the pursuit of religion
• ...pursuit of ideology
• predict that now ideology now kills more than religion
• Information operations
• targeted at belief systems
• goal to move people within info space
• change beliefs
• change value judgments
• relies on underlying epidemiological model for spread of beliefs
• causes of war
• seeking causes may be futile if war is a persistent human phenomenon
• suggests that something like "Information Peaceware"
• conclusion
• characteristics of religions and ideologies are similar for practical purposes to have the same effects when it comes to war and conflict.

ICIW2008: Implementation of a Multilevel Wiki for Cross-Domain Collaboration

Cynthia E. Irvine, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA

• Motivation
• collaboration permits information sharing
• attractive collaboration tool
• can it be applied in an MLS environment
• [M: don't comment on Wikipedia's "legitimacy", not relevant here in the least]
• objective
• develop multilevel wiki
• want high assurance policy enforcement
• run it as untrusted subject outside of TCB
• Testbed design slide
• highlights
• high assurance components
• ["thin client running OS from a CD"???]
• COTS components
• Underlying server
• BAE XTS-400
• "{linux like" interface
• background
• more than 140 wiki engines available
• aims
• narrow list
• select one or two to test
• selection methodology
• extensive public use
• wiki engines
• wikimatrix
• wikipedia
• considerations for MYSEA environment
• execute on red hat 8
• interface w/ apache
• simple setup, flat-file system
• other considerations
• popularity
• features
• MediaWiki used as a baseline
• Flat-file wiki list
• Short-listed wikis features slide
• PmWiki
• TWiki
• 2 determining factors
• identity-based access control
• concurrent editing
• Decision
• TWiki
• better footprint
• better user control
• better editing
• porting methodology
• run on plain Red Hat 8
• Port Wiki to XTS-400 for execution as a single-level subject
• make multilevel aware
• web-based collaboration support
• logs into system
• logs into wiki
• user can read, edit, create
• high users able to read and modify content at high, able to view at low
• low users only able to read and modify wiki content at low, can link to high but not create high target
• wiki design & architecture
• directory organization
• standard twiki architacture
• apache runs as singe user
• file system DAC
• wiki DAC
• MYSEA WebDAV DAC
• Apache
• MYSEA Apache Config
• Implications
• Users can bypass TWiki access controls by going directly to filesystem
• Solution Space
• run on dedicated server
• Testing
• conductedtesting at various stages
• objectives
• test plans conform to MYSEA documentation standard
• Wiki in MYSEA visualization slide
• Future work
• Single signon
• Multilevel data fusion

ICIW2008: Understanding IRC Bot Behaviors in a Network-centric Attack Detection and Prevention

Gail-Joon Ahn, UNC Charlotte

• motivation
• malicious bots
• surgein attacks
• 1241 bots collected by them in the past year
• 25% not detected by AV tools
• background
• most unknown bots are not detected
• risk-aware detection and prevention
• taxonomy of botnets is available
• approach
• components work individually & in cooperation
• analysis is performed both on and off the internet
• repository system component
• pattern correlation system component
• correlation system
• Traffic analysis
• detect malicious agents
• something else
• something else
• IRC Sandman
• Simulator
• Animations of how it works
• ongoing effort
• bot characteristics
• IRC conversation
• Intel attribution
• building new maps with various knowledge bases

ICIW2008: The Impact of Vista and Federal Desktop Core Configuration on Incident Response

Daniel J. Cotton, Univ of Nebraska, Omaha

• Vista Firewall
• filter incoming & outgoing traffic
• IPSec
• Address space layout randomization (ASLR)
• Moves vista around in memory
• BitLocker
• hard drive encryption
• uses TPM @ bootup
• can be used in one of three modes
• 128-bit AES, can use 256-bit
• User access control
• red/yellow/blue/gray backgrounds have meanings
• user accounts
• programs run at the level of the default user
• must elevate to run as admin
• filesystem
• volume boot record has moved
• journaling
• directory structure changes
• symbolic links
• junction points
• virtual folders
• registry structure changes
• virtual registry
• recycle bin moved & contents changed
• event logs
• xml format
• 30 different event logs
• forensic testing preparation and execution
• downloaded text virtual machines from NIST
• set up w/ default settings
• set of no-cost comm and line tools
• executed all from batch script
• run each tools separately to find differences
• focused on command line tools
• tool list not meant to be complete
• in Vista run as regular user and as admin
• impact of Vista on the tools
• 3 out of 46 failed completely
• one failed to resolve installation date
• some ran with gray UAC window
• some ran on xp as user but wouldn't run witout admin on Vista
• Impact of Vista on *.mui files
• majority failed
• .mui file must be copied to the trusted media
• this behavior is not well documented
• Impact of FDCC
• only two tools failed
• impact minimal
• conclusion
• impact of vista on incident response is significant
• changes need to be made to the toolset
• impact of FDCC is less than anticipated

ICIW2008: Afternoon Keynote

Are the System Security Watchmen Asleep? Dr. Roger Schell, Aesec Corporation, Palo Alto, CA

• Executives are frequently clueless about security
• rely on professionals to be their watchmen
• "acceptable risk" based on gross misperception
• serious failure by security professionals
• "watchmen" responsible for likely disasters
• air gap between domains is secure - but crippling
• multi-level security slows or prevents info sharing
• misguided mgt response
• accredit and deploy low insurance platforms
• ignore that low assurance is unevaluatable
• exacerbate risks with plans to get well
• watchmen - sound the alarm
• subversion threat is serious and growing
• unconscionable use of overly weak solution
• verifiable protection technology languishes
• cross-domain solutions
• challenge is CDS connectivity
• connection of disparate domains is multilevel
• Cyber warfard subversion likely
• tiger teams are subversion tool of choice
• adversaries can use 30+ years experience
• buy IT solution from your mortal enemy?
• Trojan horse attacks
• hidden functionality in application
• application user is unwitting agent
• current networks' open vast opportunity
• 3000+ products online have easter eggs in them, all benign, doesn't mean all will be benign
• Trap Door attack
• malicious code in platform
• can be remotely activated/deactivated
• efficacy and effectiveness demonstrated
• summary of subversion process
• infrastructure subversion
• execution of artifice software
• (optional) "two card loader"
• access to unauthorized domain data
• weakest link in flawed solutions
• single flawed interface exposes whole net
• "secure application" is non-computable
• "secure" pixie dust components
• vested interest research "sand boxes"
• hard problems for MLC systems remain
• CDS can be no better than platform it is on
• flaws in solutions missed
• false security from isolated components
• accreditations cannot responsibly judge flaws
• only a veriftably secure CDS is evaluatable
• impact indications and warning
• vendor downloadable product subverted
• intrusion can replace traditional espionage
• SW subversion steals credit/debit card data
• military recognition of subversion
• Sorry state of defense today
• sharing data across desparate domains need MLS
• isolation obstructs missions
• any low connection => MLS
• class A1resists subversion
• share but resist subversion
• proven methods evaluated and deployed TCB
• mature, proven trusted systems technology
• "rainbow series"
• verifiably secure: Class A1/EAL7
• only this class excudes malicious software
• proven solution: security kernel
• illustrative MLS demonstrations
• multilevel secure web server
• multilevel ftp server
• covert communications proxy
• validated verifiable technology
• blacker
• hsrp
• chots guard
• cots trusted oracle 7
• saclant client/server
• affpb crypto-seal guard
• more opportunities
• mls networked windows
• mls network attached storage
• guards & filters
• real-time exec
• verifiably secure mls linux
• identity management
• mls handheld network devices
• cost/benefit of evaluated protection capabliities
• more cost, more benefit
• conclusion
• subversion threat is serious and growing
• unconscionable use of overly weak solutions
• verifiable protection technology languishes
• customers aren't telling vendors security is a priority

ICIW2008: Interactive Visualization of Fused Intrusion Detection Data

Stuart Kurkowski, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB

• Work in progress, developing the tool to do all this
• Fused Alert Data
• alert data is cleaned and reduced to remove redundant or false-positive alerts
• IDS Alerts and log files are grouped into "tracks"
• 10939 CGI Script events reduced to 150 tracks
• Cyber situation awareness model
• level 0 & 1 exist
• level 2+ is this project
• three part approach
• fused track data only
• minimalist additional data & track data
• visual attributes for context awareness
• why visualization?
• large volume of data
• visualization advantages
• more resources to apply
• humans process visual data faster
• relevant info visualized not searched
• patterns easier to recognize
• temporal activity becomes more obvious
• more configurable interface
• Other products
• NVisionIP 2004
• PortVIs 2005
• VisFlowConnect 2005
• VIAssist 2007
• VisAlert 2005
• Methodologies
• lots of screenshots. See fickr tag iciw2008 in my account for photos
• TCPDump data linked with the tracks to give additional context and information
• the visualizations involve a dynamic and interactive process (i.e. filters)
• filters can be saved and retrieved to run against different datasets
• Results
• allows visualization of heterogeneous sources
• provides more context
• provides viz filter
• easier to project behavior
• future
• add database source to front end
• colors, shapes & borders to be added
• directional information

ICIW2008: Outsourcing and the Insider Threat

Carl Colwill, BT DEsign Security Risk & Compliance, UK

• "The insider will always be the greatest threat"
• Worry about the senior people, not just the lowest people
• hard to distinguish your people from 3rd party people due to so much outsourcing
• it's a rapidly changing world
• national and international boundaries are being stretched
• India is a playground for intelligence communities right now
• risk assessments are essential
• incorporate regional factors
• what are the crown jewels?
• highlight risk priorities
• identify layers of control
• streamlined risk assessment tools need to feed into business decisions
• By outsourcing you may actually be giving away confidentially
• new opportunities for attack
• loyalty thresholds
• most threat agents will apply inducements to turn insiders
• failing that they'll infiltrate with their own people
• complex mix of threat agents and influences
• what can be done?
• many controls
• physical
• logical
• personnel
• key topics
• categorizing 3rd parties
• segregation (physical & logical)
• minimum privileges (physical & logical)
• system & user account mgt
• many approaches can be applied to build trust and relationships
• but allin the context of massive vendor staff churn
• it's not just about technology
• compliance is fundamental
• evidence &detection
• ongoing education and awareness
• requires periodic onsite visits
• conclusions
• outsourcing is increasing attach posibilities
• these threats can be assessed, modeled & managed
• however can be expensive
• it's a balance of risk and cost

ICIW2008: Morning notes

• Conference is tightly scheduled. All presentations are 20 Min + 5 min for Q&A then 5 min to move to next session.
• Ooh! There's going to be a tour on the on-site supercomputer at the end of the day. Hope I can take photos.
• Hosting Institute director: "We have the right people here working on the right issues" which makes us all feel safer

Information Warfare and Security Conference

Today I'm attending day one of a two-day conference titled he 3rd International Conference on I-Warfare and Security on the University of Nebraska, Omaha campus. I'm very interested yet I'm sure I'm in over my head. There are folks from all over the worls here including major universities and a lot of Air Force personnel. Here's the sessions I plan on attending today:

• Outsourcing and the Insider Threat: An Increasing Security Risk
• Interactive Visualization of Fused Intrusion Detection Data
• Using Markov Models to Crack Passwords
• The Impacts of Vista and Federal Destop Core Configuration on Incident Response
• Understanding IRC Bot Behaviors in a Network-centric Attack Detection and Prevention
• Implementation of a Multilevel Wiki fro Cross-Domain Collaboraton
• Religion, Ideology and Information Warfare

I'll do my best to blog throughout the day but I'm not sure how much I'll be able to easily and clearly explain on the fly. However, here's the ironic thing: I got in for free. This was through someone at the Univeristy Library. However, it seems I didn't make it on to the ist of registered conference attendees. No problem, they took my name, said come back later as they'll make me a badge, handed me a conference packet, and told me to enjoy the conference. By thew way, did I mention this was a "security" conference? On another note, the WiFi here is working great and I'm doing all this on the Cloudbook.